Osgoode Hall Law Journal
Volume 50, Issue 2 (Winter 2012)

Article 5

Book Review: American Property: A History of
How, Why and What We Own, by Stuart Banner
Douglas D. Harris

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj
Book Review

Citation Information
Harris, Douglas D.. "Book Review: American Property: A History of How, Why and What We Own, by Stuart Banner." Osgoode Hall
Law Journal 50.2 (2012) : 465-469.
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol50/iss2/5

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Osgoode Hall Law Journal by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons.

465

Book Review
AMERICAN PROPERTY: A HISTORY OF HOW, WHY AND
WHAT WE OWN, by Stuart Banner 1
DOUGLAS C. HARRIS 2
PROPERTY LAW IS ABOUT THINGS, but only secondarily. It is primarily about

relationships between people as they pertain to things. As a result, although
we commonly identify material and immaterial things as private, common, or
state property, property law deals with the subset of human relationships that
determines rights and responsibilities with respect to things. The institution of
property law—the rules that define this subset of human relationships—arises
in the context of scarcity. When things are scarce and accordingly hold exchange
value, humans construct ideas of ownership. We have been doing so for
millennia, or at least long enough that the subject of property law has acquired
a reputation as antiquarian. Certainly in the common law tradition, many
property law courses appear lost in the mist of English legal history. This need
not be so. Property law deals with the allocation of scarce resources and therefore
is also about the allocation of power. Understood this way, property law can be a
lens through which to understand many of the most pressing social issues of the
day. Similarly, the history of property law need not be dull. At least ten centuries of
social change, economic transformation, technological innovation, and human
drama can be seen in the customs and conventions, judicial decisions, and statutes
that comprise the law of property in common law jurisdictions.
In American Property: A History of How, Why and What We Own, Stuart
Banner, the prolific legal historian and property law scholar, sets out to describe
contestation and change in ideas about property over several centuries in the
United States.3 The result is a beautifully and accessibly written book, stunning
1.
2.
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in scope, elegant in structure, and remarkably revealing in its detail about the
debates over and the uses of property law doctrine and of the broader ideas that
support the divergent interests and claims.
Banner provides a rough chronological structure for the book, devoting most
of his attention to the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, although the fourteen
chapters are not identified by decade or era. Instead, the individual chapters focus
on specific themes and can be tied loosely into bundles, each animated by a set of
shared questions. One thematic bundle addresses changing understandings of the
idea of property.4 In these chapters, Banner situates analyses of changing property
doctrine in the politics of property and, more specifically, in the balancing of
public regulation and private property.
In “A Bundle of Rights,” for example, Banner disputes the conventional account
of the emergence of this metaphor for property, arguing that it appeared in the
nineteenth century as part of an effort to enhance constitutional protection for
private property—not in the early twentieth century in the service of a progressive
effort to enhance state intervention in the economy, as has been conventionally
understood. Banner also provides an engaging account of the Realist articulation
of property as power in a later chapter, “People, Not Things.” Nevertheless, he
maintains that the metaphor appeared earlier, in the service of those looking to
enhance rather than diminish protection for private property: “In the late
nineteenth century,” writes Banner, “the idea of property as a bundle of rights was
a distinctly antiregulatory idea, one that served the specific purpose of justifying
constitutional doctrines that would limit the power of legislatures to regulate in
ways that would reduce the value of property.”5
Interspersed through these chapters on the idea of property are five chapters
about “owning”—owning news, sound, fame, wavelengths, and life—in which
Banner describes the efforts to reconfigure property in the face of new technologies.
In many instances, new technology made existing property rights worthless, or at
3.

4.

5.

Stuart Banner’s earlier books include Who Owns the Sky: The Struggle to Control Airspace from
the Wright Brothers On (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008); Possessing the Pacific:
Land, Settlers, and Indigenous People from Australia to Alaska (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 2007); How the Indians Lost Their Land: Law and Power on the Frontier (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 2005); and Legal Systems in Conflict: Property and Sovereignty in
Missouri, 1750-1860 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2000).
This bundle includes five chapters: “A Bundle of Rights,” “People, Not Things,” “Law of the
Land,” “The New Property,” and “Property Resurgent.” See Banner, supra note 1, ch 3 at 45;
supra note 1, ch 5 at 94; supra note 1, ch 9 at 181; supra note 1, ch 11 at 220; supra note 1,
ch 13 at 257 (respectively).
Ibid at 71-72.
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least much less valuable. In “Owning Sound,”6 for example, Banner recounts how
composers, music publishers, recording companies, musicians, and broadcasters
responded to a series of technological changes—phonographs, player pianos,
radios, vinyl records, Long Play records, and cassette tapes—that allowed humans
to capture, broadcast, and mass distribute sound. Banner focuses on the changing
coalitions of interest that sought to construct and then to preserve property
rights, and therefore value, in the face of technological innovations that had the
effect of undermining once-profitable activities. Those in the music industry
focused their efforts on the law of copyright, and Banner reveals a mutually constitutive
dynamic between that industry, technological change, and the law. The result in
law is a royalty regime in which composers and music publishers earn money
when their songs are recorded or played for audiences, but performers and record
companies do not. How has this affected the making of music? Banner notes the
disappearance of the once sharp line between composers and performers. In the
1950s, only seven per cent of popular songs were performed by their composers;
in 2004, eighty-eight per cent of performers were playing their own songs.7 Bob
Dylan may well have inspired a generation of singer-songwriters, but Banner’s
analysis also suggests that the outcome of disputes over the ownership of sound
in the creative process of music making should not be ignored.
In addition to these thematically bundled chapters, Banner includes an
introductory chapter on the forms of property that were lost in the trans-Atlantic
migration of the common law (varieties of land tenures and estates, many nonpossessory interests, rights of common, et cetera) as land was increasingly
refashioned as “just another commodity to be bought and sold.”8 There is also a
chapter on “The Rise of Intellectual Property”9 (a subject that figures prominently in
most of the “owning” chapters) and a chapter on the changing legal architecture
of home ownership as the introduction of cooperative and later condominium
enhanced the possibility of owning single units in multi-unit developments.10
In this chapter, Banner asks why condominium, which provided such an effective
means of dividing ownership in multi-unit buildings, did not arrive in the United
States sooner than the 1960s. He offers a number of “institutional obstacles”11
as explanation, including the reticence of title insurers to insure single units in

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Ibid, ch 6 at 109.
Ibid at 128.
Ibid at 20.
Ibid, ch 2 at 23.
Ibid, ch 8 at 177 (“From the Tenement to the Condominium”).
Ibid at 176.
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multi-unit buildings, the hesitation of mortgage lenders to take that property
interest as security for a loan, the inability of municipal bureaucracies to impose
and collect property taxes on individual units in multi-unit buildings, and the
uncertainty around the drafting of instruments to define the individual units and
the rights and responsibilities attached to them. Statutory provisions in the 1960s
would help overcome most of these obstacles and, once surmounted, condominium as
a legal form would proliferate rapidly, particularly where land prices were high.12
Banner’s analysis is a good example of his capacity to move between legal doctrine,
broader ideas about property, and the social and institutional setting to explain
shifts in the way that people own property.
American Property is not a comprehensive survey of the history of property
law in the United States and was not written as one. Land and intellectual property
receive most of the attention, personal property receives almost none. There is no
discussion of family property or Aboriginal property,13 and Banner has said that
he wished he had been prescient enough about the collapse in American housing markets
to include a chapter on mortgages.14 Although the idea of common property
is mentioned—once when Banner describes the stripping of various forms of
property from the law in the transplanting of the English common law to North
America, and again when he discusses private property as one response to the
tragedy of the commons—it does not receive focused attention. Similarly, state
property is the starting point for the chapter on the licensing of the radio wavelength spectrum,15 but serves primarily as a backdrop for Banner’s focus on the
allocation of private rights.
In addition, Banner does not offer an overarching explanation or argument
about the role of law, nor of property law in particular. Many chapters end with
equivocal statements about the effect of the property regimes described: “there
would be winners and losers from land use regulation”;16 “the new property was
simply not as powerful a tool as its proponents hoped or its opponents feared”;17
“property remained an important value, but so did sound governance.”18 At
several points in the book, including the final sentence, Banner suggests that
12. See Douglas C Harris, “Condominium and the City: The Rise of Property in Vancouver”
(2011) 36:3 Law & Soc Inq 694.
13. Banner has published extensively on property law and Aboriginal peoples. See supra note 3.
14. Stuart Banner, “Author Meets Critics” (Seminar delivered at the Third Annual Association for
Law, Property and Society Conference, Washington DC, 2 & 3 March 2012), [unpublished].
15. Supra note 1, ch 10 at 211 (“Owning Wavelengths”).
16. Supra note 1 at 201.
17. Ibid at 237.
18. Ibid at 275.
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“property has always been a means rather than an ends.”19 This is consistent
with his overall message that property doctrine is a malleable and contested
structure of ideas deployed for particular purposes, but Banner does not offer
a larger framework in which to understand the outcome of those contests, nor
does he evaluate attempts of others to do so. Willard Hurst’s argument that the
property law regime created the conditions for American economic expansion
in the nineteenth century is an indirect presence but is not directly engaged.20 A
discussion of Morton Horwitz’s class-inflected analysis is similarly absent,21 as is
an engagement with Harold Demsetz’s law and economics inspired account of
the emergence of property rights.22 Banner is certainly interested in the politics
of property, but he does not use the material to develop a larger explanatory framework or to reveal his assessment of which ideas about property are to
be preferred beyond the observation that property should not be understood as
pre-political.
Although Banner might well have considered the interplay of private,
common, and state property, or engaged explicitly with the attempts of some
historians to develop larger explanatory frameworks, these and other absences are
less shortcomings than simply reflections of the limits of this project. American
Property is a model of historical legal scholarship and a pleasure to use in the
classroom. A student in my legal history course admitted to enrolling only after
he had spent the better part of an afternoon in the university bookstore reading
American Property, the central text for the course. Banner’s work will resonate not
only for legal historians of the United States, but also for those interested in changing
ideas of property and the interplay of law with technological and social change.

19. Ibid at 291.
20. James Willard Hurst, Law and the Conditions of Freedom in Nineteenth-Century United States
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1956).
21. Morton Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860 (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1977); Morton Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1870-1960
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).
22. Harold Demsetz, “Toward a Theory of Property Rights” (1967) 57:2 Am Econ Rev 347.

